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ESSAY
Relational Contract Theory and the Concept
of Exchange
PAuL J. GUDELt
This Essay is an introduction to the importance of
Relational Contract Theory and the controversy it has
created within contract law scholarship. In examining why
the theory is especially important and controversial today,
the Essay explores specific current areas of inquiry within
Relational Contract Theory and suggests the direction in
which the theory leads contract law. Relational Contract
Theory provides an alternative to common, even standard,
ways of thinking about contract law. In presenting the
alternative that the theory offers, the Essay begins with the
narrowly legal, moves to the economic, and finishes with
the broadly philosophical. Finally, the Essay considers some
implications of Relational Contract Theory for the role of
law in regulating contracting activity.
I. LAW
Ian Macneil is the contracts scholar most responsible
t Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. This Essay was first
presented as a paper at a symposium entitled "Alternative Approaches to
Contracting" at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. I
would like to thank the organizer of the symposium, Professor Raga Garud, and
co-symposiast Professor Peter Linzer for their comments at that time. For later
comments on the Essay, I would like to thank Marilyn S. Gudel, Daniel Yeager
and Ian Macneil. I would also like to thank Sandra Murray and Anita Simons
for their valuable help in preparing this Essay.
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1998] RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
for the concept of relational contract.' His work demon-
strates that one can arrange all exchange between humans
on a continuum, from the most discrete exchange at one end
to the most relational on the other end. A discrete contract,
as the name implies, is a transaction "of short duration,
involving limited personal interactions, and with precise
party measurements of easily measured objects of ex-
change,"' such as money and some easily quantifiable good.
Macneil says that in such transactions, the complete future
of the deal, to the extent that it has any at all, is
"presentiated"--that is, the parties bring the future wholly
into the present and treat it as present through complete
planning of the transaction, planning which then binds the
parties. In a purely discrete transaction, there is nothing
that binds the parties together or connects them with each
other, except this fully articulated planning for a single,
mutually beneficial exchange.
A completely discrete transaction is an impossibility,4
but Oliver Williamson gives an example of a transaction
that is about as close to pure discreetness as one can get: a
purchase of a bottle of local spirits from a shopkeeper in a
remote area of a foreign country who one never expects to
visit again nor to recommend to one's friends.5 I might add
that the transaction would be even more discrete if the
buyer did not speak the shopkeeper's language but had to
1. The major works of Ian R. Macneil in which relational contract theory is
expounded are: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACT]; CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS (2d ed.
1978) [hereinafter MACNEIL, CONTRACTS]; Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility
and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHiCS 567 (1986) [hereinafter Macneil, Exchange
Revisited]; Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340
(1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]; Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); Economic Analysis of Contractual
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contract-
ual Relations]; Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854
(1978) [hereinafter, Macneil, Long-Term Economic Relations]; Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974) [hereinafter
Macneil, Presentiation]; The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691
(1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Futures of Contracts].
2. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 12.
3. See Macneil, Long-Term Economic Relations, supra note 1, at 863.
4. See id. at 856, 857 n.10.
5. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 247 (1979).
764
1998] RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
use sign language, and did not use the local currency but
bartered a personal possession.
Relational contracts, conversely, are characterized by
long duration, personal involvement by the parties and the
exchange, at least in part, of things difficult to monetize or
otherwise measure. The beginning and end of relations tend
to be gradual and incremental, rather than, as Macneil says
in regard to discrete transactions, "sharp in, sharp out."6
Finally, again in Macneil's words, "the participants never
intend or expect to see the whole future of the relation as
presentiated at any single time, but view the relation as an
ongoing integration of behavior to grow and vary with
events in a largely unforeseeable future.... .', It follows
that planning for relational contracts is often tentative
rather than entirely binding and often involves not simply
the substance of the exchange, as in discrete transactions,
but also planning of structures and processes to govern the
relation in the future. Like a purely discrete transaction, a
purely relational contract is probably impossible. But
toward the relational end of the exchange spectrum we find
such things as franchise arrangements, long-term employ-
ment, professional partnerships, labor/management rela-
tions and, quintessentially, marriage.
Macneil also recognized that discrete contracts alone
cannot come close to satisfying the need of modern indus-
trial society, with its dependence on massive capital invest-
ment, for a combination of the stability provided by long-
range planning and the flexibility to deal with continuously
changing circumstances.' The result is that relational
contracts predominate; even the most discrete transaction
is embedded in heavily relational patterns.9
6. Macneil, Futures of Contracts, supra note 1, at 750.
7. See MACNEIL, CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 13.
8. This does not mean that there is still not a great deal of discrete planning
in modern economic life. The complexity of economic activity demands a great
deal of detailed, discrete planning. The point is that this planning takes place in
relational structures. Macneil says that sometimes the best response of the
legal system to a dispute over an exchange will be to give this discrete planning
its full effect. "But those solutions will be 'best' because the overall relational
circumstances so indicate, not because of the general dominance of juris-
prudential systems based on enhancing discreteness and presentiation."
MACNEIL, Long-Term Economic Relations, supra note 1, at 886 n.101.
9. Macneil has argued that discrete transactions work well as a means of
exchanging certain kinds of goods and services, but that the production of goods
and services (a much larger part of economic activity) is carried out through
765
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Part of the immediate impact in legal scholarship of
Macneil's discrete/relational scheme was that it provided a
powerful means of criticizing existing contract law.1" It
quickly became apparent that the doctrines of what are
called classical and neo-classical contract law are largely
based on the assumption that all contracts are discrete.
Contract law was and is relatively well adapted to dealing
with discrete transactions. However, it was and is ill-
equipped to deal with problems arising out of contract rela-
tions. To put it another way, contract law had a powerful
bias in favor of discreteness, and discrete legal doctrines
applied to relational contracts often produced results that
were intuitively unfair.
A quick example from the high period of classical
contract law is Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran." Missouri
Furnace (the buyer) contracted with Cochran (the seller) for
a year's supply of coal, to be delivered in installments on
every working day of the year. The contract price was $1.20
per ton. Shortly into the year, the price of coal rose to $4.00
per ton and Cochran told Missouri Furnace that it was
repudiating the contract. Missouri Furnace then "cov-
ered"-it contracted with another seller for the remainder
of the year at the then-market price of $4.00 per ton. It then
sued Cochran for standard contract damages, the difference
between $4.00 and $1.20 per ton.
12
Unfortunately for Missouri Furnace, shortly after it
patterns of relational exchange. See Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do
Know and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483, 485-91 [hereinafter Macneil,
Relational Contract]. Macneil says:
In the very heyday of laissez-faire, wherever there were sales of wheat
in markets, there were banks financing every step from the fields
themselves to final delivery, family farms growing the wheat, harvester
teams harvesting it, private companies or cooperatives storing it,
railroads and carters moving it, mills milling it, and baking companies
and families baking it. All these carried on their operations in internal
patterns of relational exchange ....
Id. at 490-91.
10. See, e.g., Wallace Y. Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Con-
tract, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 (1984); see generally Macneil, Presentiation,
supra note 1 (providing a detailed critique of several sections of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic
Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV.
927 (1990) (providing a powerful relational critique of the current state of legal
regulation of franchising).
11. 8 F. 463 (C.C. W.D. Pa. 1881).
12. Id. at 464.
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entered into the second contract the price of coal dropped
back to the range of $1.30 per ton. The court ruled that the
measure of damages for breach of such a contract is the
difference between $1.20 per ton and the value of coal at the
time each delivery would have been made." Thus Missouri
Furnace could collect as damages only the difference, if any,
between the contract price with Cochran, $1.20, and the
market price of coal for every day coal was delivered to it
for the remainder of the year. Yet no matter what the daily
market price of coal, Missouri Furnace was still committed
to paying" $4.00 a ton for coal pursuant to its forward
contract with second seller. In essence, Missouri Furnace
was punished for entering into a contract to cover, even
though the price of coal under that contract was completely
reasonable when the contract was entered into. The court
would rather force Missouri Furnace to buy replacement
coal on the spot market every day; saying, "As the [buyer]
was not bound to enter into the new forward contract, it
seems to me it did so at its own risk.. .."4 This horrifying
result comes from the court's treatment of a one-year-long
contract as if it were a year-long series of identical (except
for price) daily contracts and illustrates a bias in favor of
discreetness in the starkest way possible.
Today, happily, Missouri Furnace would come out
differently under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, governing sales contracts.' 5 But there are many
contemporary instances of the lack of fit between a contract
law oriented toward discreetness and the realities of
relational contracts. In particular, criticism of existing law
by relational contract theorists has centered on one
persistent tendency of classical contract law-namely, its
attempt to locate the entire content of the parties'
agreement, and thus the entire source of their obligation to
one another, in an initial moment of agreement which
contracts treatises describe as the "meeting of the minds."
Correspondingly, courts have been extremely reluctant to
13. Id.
14. Id. at 467. In other words, the court held that Missouri Furnace violated
the principle of mitigation of damages. It could not recover the damages it
claimed because they were reasonably avoidable.
15. Section 2-712 of the U.C.C. provides that after a breach by a seller, a
buyer may recover the difference between the cover price and the contract price.
This section further defines "cover" as "any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller" (emphasis added).
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intervene in any contract if that intervention cannot be
justified by reference, albeit fictional, to this magic moment
of agreement.
The case of Air Terminal Servs., Inc. v. United States'6
provides another quick illustration. Air Terminal con-
tracted with the United States to operate parking lots at
Washington's National Airport for three years. One year
later the United States built a large number of metered
parking spaces near the airport terminal. As a result, Air
Terminal's revenues from short-term parking dropped
dramatically. Air Terminal sued, claiming that by installing
the parking meters the United States had breached its
contract with Air Terminal." The court reasoned that the
United States had never promised that it would not install
parking meters. A warranty of this type was not part of the
original agreement. In fact, the court noted, the official
regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, buried
deep somewhere in the Federal Register, reserved to the
Director of the Airport the right to control traffic on the
streets and roads of the airport. As such, Air Terminal had
"at least constructive knowledge" 8 that there was no
agreement that parking meters wouldn't be installed. Air
Terminal was thus denied relief, and its petition was
dismissed. 9
This decision would probably come out differently
today. A court would likely find that in installing the me-
ters, the United States had violated the covenant of good
faith that the law implies into every contract."0 The
covenant of good faith requires that no party to a contract
shall do anything to impair another party's ability to
receive the benefits of the contract. Yet that is exactly what
the United States did in Air Terminal. The United States
violated a provision of the contract, one that came into
being at the moment of agreement, even if only impliedly as
a matter of law. In other words, today a court would justify
16. 330 F.2d 974 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
17. Id. at 974-77.
18. Id. at 977.
19. Id. at 980.
20. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1979). Two classic examinations of the doctrine are Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 369 (1980) and Robert S. Summers, 'Good Faith" in General Contract Law
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968).
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intervention in Air Terminal by referring back to the
original moment of agreement after all. The only alter-
native approach available to courts is to rewrite the parties'
contract.
The idea that courts might rewrite the contract of the
parties is anathema to the legal mind, and contract law has
been dominated by this dichotomized way of organizing and
thinking about legal responses to contract: implementing
the original intent of the parties versus writing a contract
for them.21 This approach overlooks the theory in relational
contracts that there is no simple "intent of the parties," that
the parties themselves are continually engaged in "rewrit-
ing the contract" and that a legal approach which looks
back to intent at the moment of initial agreement in effect
does rewrite the contract by ignoring the reality of the
parties' developed relation.
These considerations are relevant to the real question
that Relational Contract Theory raises for contract law:
what is the source of binding contractual obligation? Is it
solely the initial agreement of the parties at the time of
contracting? Relational Contract Theory suggests that obli-
gations evolve in the course of long-term relations, that
contractual obligations cannot always be derived from an
originary act of initial agreement, and that they may derive
from norms other than the express (or even implied)
consent of the parties. Clearly this is an "alternative ap-
proach to contracting," distinct from the basic legal defi-
nition of "contract" that every first year law student learns:
a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the
21. One example can illustrate how far this dichotomy can be taken. In
Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 268 N.W. 634, 634 (Minn. 1936), the
parties contracted for the sale of a fixed quantity of motor oil. Under the
contract, the buyer was to specify at a later date the SAE weights he wanted;
the price of the oil varied according to the weight. Id. at 634-35. The buyer then
repudiated the contract without ever having specified the weights he wanted,
and the seller sued. Id at 634. In this situation, fairness and common sense
dictate that damages could be calculated based on the cheapest oil weight, since
the buyer had contracted for at least this much. Instead, the court held for the
buyer and denied all recovery, on the ground that since the contract price could
not be determined without the buyer having specified the weights, it was
impossible to measure damages. Id. at 635. The court said it could not "be
allowed to speculate as to the measure of damages, and there is no sound
authority for taking an average or an arbitrary price as the contract price in a
case of this kind." Id. This is refusing to write a contract for the parties taken to
the point of paranoia.
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law will give a remedy.22 A promise is a manifestation of
intent to act in a certain way in the future.23 Relational
Contract Theory departs from this promise-centered theory
of contract. Macneil, for example, defines contract as "the
projection of exchange into the future."24 This means that an
expectation arises out of on-going exchange relations that
future exchanges will continue and will be "entirely free of
all other coercion or ordering." 5 This expectation emerges
from and accounts for the fact that relationships charac-
terized by ongoing exchange are often defined by particular
traditions, customs, habits, status, kinship, command or
religious obligations.
The legal system has been slow to account for the
realities of relational contracts. The constant attempt to
force relational wine into discrete bottles, as with the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing discussed above,"
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
23. See id. § 2.
24. Macneil, Futures of Contracts, supra note 1, at 712-13.
25. Id. at 715. The definitive statement of a promise-centered approach to
contracts remains CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). See generally
Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986);
but see Lightsey, supra note 10 (criticizing the promise-centered and consent
theories of contract). Macneil provides a detailed criticism of another promise-
oriented analysis of contract, that of Joel Banks and Banks McDowell in their
article entitled The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary
Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.J. 24 (1983). In essence, Macneil argues that Banks'
and McDowell's balance theory of contracts cannot account for relational
obligations and norms except in an interstitial, and therefore secondary or
derived, way. See Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 9, at 498-508.
26. In Presentiation, supra note 1, Macneil provides one example of how the
law attempts to formulate rules that are responsive to the relational character
of exchange. The example is the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 267
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1973), which sets forth the following factors for
determining materiality of breach:
1. Extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected;
2. Extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for
the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
3. Extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture;
4. Likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances;
5. Extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing;
6. Extent to which it reasonably appears to the injured party that delay
may prevent or hinder him in making reasonable substitute ar-
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has hindered the progress of Relational Contract Theory.
Today, for example, one area of controversy in contract law
concerns the extent to which the law should restrict the
parties' ability to terminate so-called "contracts terminable
at will."2 7 It has long been the rule in American law that
contracts that do not specify a duration, that lack a set
termination date, are contracts terminable by either party
at any time. In recent years there has been a movement to
impose limits on the more powerful party's ability to ter-
minate, even though there was no initial promise or
agreement to limit that party's ability to terminate." For
example, consider the following scenario. A candy company
fired an at-will employee who had worked for the company
for thirty-two years, had risen from pot washer to vice-
president, had always received favorable performance
evaluations and had been assured that his job was secure if
he did his work and remained loyal to the company. The
California Court of Appeals in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.
rangements;
7. Extent to which the agreement provides for performance without
delay, but a material failure to perform or to offer to perform on a
stated day does not of itself discharge the other party's remaining
duties unless the circumstances, including the language of the
agreement, indicated that performance or tender by that day is
important.
Macneil believes these factors, which Comment (a) to this section labeled
"imprecise and flexible," capture just the "impression essential to the operation
of ongoing relations." Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 1, at 608. In the final
version of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979), the above factors
were divided into two sections: § 241, CIRCUMSTANCES SIGNIFICANT IN DETER-
MINING WHETHER A FAILURE IS MATERIAL (which incorporates the first five
factors), and § 242, CIRCUMSTANCES SIGNIFICANT IN DETERMINING WHEN RE-
MAINING DUTIES ARE DISCHARGED (which adds the last two factors).
27. See generally Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment
as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323
(1986); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REV.
947 (1984). An influential early writing is Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at
Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
28. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (ap-
plying an implied-in-fact contract theory); Woolley v. Hoffmnan-LaRoche, Inc.,
491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (reviewing an employee handbook as a basis for
contract); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982) (discussing
an employee's reliance on an employee handbook); Grouse v. Group Health Plan
Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (applying a promissory estoppel theory);
Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (applying
an implied-in-law contract theory); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561
(D.N.H. 1974) (applying an implied-in-fact contract theory).
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held that in this scenario, the company had an implied
obligation to fire the employee only for good cause, even
though the company had never made an explicit promise to
the employee, much less made one at the outset of the
employment relation.29
Law addresses not only descriptive but also normative
problems. That is, courts must base their judgments not
only on descriptive analysis but also normative principles.
For example, the result in See's Candies is consistent with a
description from organizational theory which maintains
that employees of a firm generally have a closer
relationship to the firm than its shareholders." The
California Court of Appeals, however, could not base its
decision solely on this description from organizational
theory. The law poses a normative requirement to justify
applying the state's coercive power to enforce a duty not to
terminate the vice-president except for good cause. For
centuries contract law has justified using state coercion by
looking to the principle of assent:"' the law only enforces
29. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Peter Linzer argues that the nature of the modem employment relation gener-
ates obligations on the part of the employer to the employee that cannot be
wholly liquidated in "a salary or other compensation that can terminate at the
will of the owner." Linzer, supra note 27, at 426.
30. Orthodox legal analysis characterizes an employer-employee relation as
a master-slave relationship. Yet this "ignores the undoubted fact that the
employees are members of the company for which they work to a far greater
extent than are the shareholders whom the law persists on regarding as its
proprietors." See L.C.B. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 10-11 (3d ed. 1969). See
also Clyde W. Summers, Co-determination in the United States: A Projection of
Problems and Potentials, 4 J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 169 (1982)
("[Tihe employees who provide the labor are as much members of the enterprise
as the shareholders who provide the capital.").
31. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-6 (1981) (ITIhe will theory
of contract, which sees contractual obligations as essentially self-imposed, is a
fair implication of liberal individualism."); P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND
LAW 1-8 (1981) ("The classical model of contract grew up under the shadow of a
number of intellectual movements which stressed the importance of free choice
and consent as the origin of legal and moral obligation alike."); MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-22 (1993).
As articulated by earlier scholars such as Mill, and contemporary
scholars such as Hayek, Friedman, Nozick, and Fried, individual
autonomy is seen as a paramount social value and a central
precondition to individual freedom. Private ordering is most compatible
with this value because it minimizes the extent to which individuals
are subjected to externally imposed forms of coercion or socially
ordained forms of status. Private ordering is the quintessential form of
government with the consent of the governed.
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obligations the parties have voluntarily assumed. Yet in
See's Candies the employer never agreed to terminate its
employee only for good cause. If we remove the concept of
promise as the moral ground of contract enforcement, with
what do we replace it? Do we say that, in cases such as this
one, we are not enforcing a private agreement or a
voluntarily assumed responsibility, but rather a general
social standard of acceptable behavior in contractual
relations, thus pushing contract law in the direction of tort
law? 2 Or do we say that our notion of assent itself needs to
be broadened, that it no longer can be identified with the
discrete notion of promise?
This approach holds not that recent developments in
contract show a "decline of assent," but a decline of assent
discretely understood. Consider the following homely
example. About a year after our son was born, I found that I
was the one getting up to feed him at two in the morning.
This turned into an obligation and, although I had never
explicitly assented to it, there is no sense in considering it
other than a voluntarily assumed obligation. This
understanding, reflective of Relational Contract Theory,
entails a profound rethinking of some of the central
concepts of contract law, such as intention, acceptance and
agreement.
The case of Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Co.3  demonstrates the central shift in
perspective that a Relational Contract Theory analysis
demands. In the late 1970s, U.S. Steel closed two steel
plants in the Youngstown, Ohio area on grounds of
obsolescence. The workers sued to prevent the plant
closures. The court was extremely sympathetic to their
plight, saying:
Id. at 8.
32. This branch of contract theory goes back, of course, to GRANT GIMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). For a more recent discussion, see generally
Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & CoM. 193 (1982).
33. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). See Daniel A. Farber & John Matheson,
Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 'Invisible Handshake', 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 903, 938-42 (1985) (discussing the case along relational lines).
Recently, Maytag Corporation agreed to pay $11.5 million to settle a similar
suit brought by former workers at one of its closed plants in West Virginia. See
Peter Kilborn, Appliance Maker to Pay for Fleeing West Virginia, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 16, 1995, at A20. An analysis under principles of Relational Contract
Theory might even extend compensation beyond injured employees to others in
the community affected by the plant closing.
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Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been
happening for many years because of steel. Schools have been
built, roads have been built. Expansion that has taken place is
because of steel. And to accommodate that industry, lives and
destinies of the inhabitants of that community were based and
planned on the basis of that institution: steel.
3 4
The trial court even suggested that the lengthy
employment relation had vested the workers with a
property interest in the plant. 5 Yet in the end, the workers
lost their case simply because they could not prove the
technical elements of breach of contract or promissory
estoppel. 6 From the alternative perspective of Relational
Contract Theory, a court could have found that the steel
company had assented not to close the plant without
adequate notice. This conclusion, however, requires an
understanding that the discrete notions of "promise" and
"bargain" do not exhaust the definition of "voluntarily
assumed responsibilities."
II. ECONOMICS
In addition to challenging traditional legal under-
standing of concepts such as the notion of assent, Relational
Contract Theory also breaks with an understanding of
contracts strongly promoted by the law and economics
movement. Using the above example of the closed steel
plant, economists would ask why we would even want to
extend the notion of assent to find the steel company liable
to the employees when simply giving the steel company the
right to close the plants whenever it wants is the most
efficient rule. Yet as an alternative approach to contracting,
Relational Contract Theory suggests that just as the
discrete notion of assent is no longer adequate to ground
the enforcement of contracts, so too a discrete notion of
efficiency is equally inadequate.
Here a bit of background, necessarily very crude, is
required. The influence of economic thinking on law is a
recent phenomenon, dating basically from R.H. Coase's
1960 article The Problem of Social Cost37 and the
34. Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1265.
35. Id. at 1279-80.
36. Id. at 1269-79.
37. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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publication of the first edition of Richard Posner's
influential Economic Analysis of Law in 1973. Posner
popularized for a legal audience the Coase Theorem, which
says that if transaction costs are zero, resources will"naturally" and inevitably gravitate to their most efficient
allocation regardless of how property rights are initially
assigned.8 The Coase Theorem seemed dramatic to lawyers
because it said that if there are no transaction costs, then
the law doesn't affect the allocative efficiency of resource
use by assigning legal rights or liabilities to one party or
another. Moreover, Coase seemed to show that if bargaining
is costless, it will not only allocate goods but costs as well,
so that parties will always come to an agreement that
minimizes the costs or harm resulting from incompatible
uses of property. 9
Economically minded lawyers tended to draw this
moral: the purpose of the law is twofold. First, adopt
whatever legal arrangement lowers transaction costs; it is
socially desirable to keep transaction costs low, because this
promotes efficient allocation through exchange. Second, in
any given area, such as the law of torts, in which
transaction costs prevent bargaining, resolve legal disputes
by allocating rights to the party which would have
bargained for them if transaction costs were zero.4" In other
words, law should "mimic the market." All this implicitly
assumes that the ideal world, though practically
unobtainable, has no transaction costs.
The notion of bargaining in this classical microeconomic
model is extremely discrete. Long ago Victor Goldberg
convincingly argued, in work that surprisingly has not had
a large impact on legal scholarship, that "[i]f transaction
costs truly are zero, then only a very small subset of
desirable transactions will take place.'41 This is because the
commitment that one binds oneself to when contracting is
itself the establishment of transaction costs that affect one's
future behavior. As Goldberg put it, "Enforceable promises,
the very essence of classical contract theory, require that
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43-45 (3d ed. 1986)
39. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
AND ECONOMICS 41 (1992).
40. See generally S. Todd Lowry, Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and
Economics, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (1976).
41. Victor P. Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract,
10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45, 47 (1976).
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some transaction costs be positive." 2 The "bargain model"
relied on by Coase assumes that parties are able to allocate
all relevant risks at the time of contracting."3 On the other
hand transaction costs theorists "assume that uncertainty
and complexity often prevent parties from accurately
allocating all relevant risks at the time of contracting. " "
Transaction costs theorists thus study efficiency strategies
that parties create to encourage cooperation in complex
relational contracts that do not and cannot resemble the
"sale with a time lag""5 of neoclassical microeconomic
theory.
Yet Relational Contract Theory is an alternative even
to the transaction costs approach to contracting. It
embodies a different philosophical picture of human beings.
Economists assume that humans are rational wealth
maximizers, inherently selfish. Even in transaction costs
economics, the primary, if not the sole, value is efficiency.
In Oliver Williamson's work, for example, the essential
problem of complex contract governance is opportunism-
the subduing of an inevitable and inherent selfishness
within the confines of larger (but still efficiency-oriented)
governance structures. 6 Macneil's analysis of contracts
rests on a profoundly different conception of human nature.
In Macneil's own words:
As students of man in society, we are faced with an illogicality.
Man is both an entirely selfish and an entirely social creature, in
that man puts the interests of his fellows ahead of his own
interests at the same time that he puts his own interests first ....
42. Id. at 46-47.
43. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 968 n.5
(1983).
44. Id.
45. Macneil, Economic Analyses of Contractual Relations, supra note 1, at
1020.
46. ' The 'transaction-cost' economics of Oliver Williamson and his school
represents exactly such an assimilation of 'relational' insights to the liberal
model of social relations as the products of rational individual choices: solidarity
and hierarchy are explained as institutional governance forms chosen for the
purpose of realizing efficiency gains." Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, Macneil,
and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
565, 575 n.27. Macneil has said that "the transactions costs approach is far too
unrelational a starting point in analyzing relational contract." Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 483,
495 n.45
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Two principles of behavior are essential to the survival of such a
creature: solidarity and reciprocity .... Getting something back
for something given neatly releases, or at least reduces, the
tension in a creature desiring to be both selfish and social at the
same time, and solidarity-a belief in being able to depend on
another-permits the projection of reciprocity through time.
Based on this picture of human nature, Macneil
postulates that our interest in exchange is not captured by
the idea that it increases our ability to maximize individual
utility. We have as much interest in solidarity as we do in
capturing for ourselves as much of the exchange surplus as
we can. Our interest is in sustaining the proper
combination of solidarity and reciprocity. Utility maximiza-
tion is not the only human motivation that functions in
exchange relations. Macneil says:
It is thus a mistake to think of "net utilitarian advantage" in its
outside-of-society context involving fictional maximizers of
individual utility, equally powerful or not. In the real world there
are only enhancers of individual utility immersed in relations
creating countless countermotives. Exchange is virtually always
relational exchange, that is, exchange carried on within relations
having significant impact on its goals, conduct and 
effect.48
If contractual relations are controlled by norms other
than utility maximization, what are they? Macneil suggests
ten norms: (1) role integrity (behaving consistently within
one's role within a contractual relation, and managing
conflicts between and within roles); (2) reciprocity (the
problem of getting something back for something given); (3)
implementation of planning; (4) effectuation of consent; (5)
flexibility; (6) contractual solidarity (which includes the
norm of preservation of the relation); (7) protection of the
restitution, reliance and expectation interests; (8) creation
and restraint of power; (9) propriety of means (using only
appropriate means to gain any end); and (10)
harmonization with the social matrix."9 Macneil argues that
47. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 348-49.
48. Macneil, Exchange Revisited, supra note 1, at 577.
49. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 347; see also MACNEIL,
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 40; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract
Theory as Sociology, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274-76
(1987). Macneil does not claim that this list is necessarily complete or
exhaustive. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 343 n.5.
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all these norms are essential elements of contract behavior
and therefore constitute the immanent values of such
behavior, in the sense that if any of these norms begin to
deteriorate within a contractual relation, that relation will
begin to fail.5" Constantly reinforcing these norms will allow
the institution of contract to remain healthy and robust and
so perform its job of satisfying both the selfish and social
sides of human beings.5'
Certainly Macneil did not get these "internal values ""
of contract from classical and neoclassical contract law,
with their discrete and utilitarian biases. One of Macneil's
significant contributions to legal scholarship has been his
reminding us of what had been, surprisingly, almost
forgotten in law-namely, the inclusive nature of
contractual relations. In a world of relational contracts, a
dysfimctionally discrete body of contract law cannot survive
for very long. One way contract law has adapted to
relational contracts is through creating, on a rather ad hoc
basis, doctrines and exceptions to doctrines that avoid some
of the worst results of a purely discrete law. Another way
has been to "spin off' areas of relational contract law into
specialty areas."
Consider the highly relational contracting structure of
labor/management relations, for example. Federal courts,
interpreting the National Labor Relations Act and
subsequent related statutes, have developed a body of law
that is much more explicitly relational than common law
contract law.54 Yet few, if any, first year contracts courses in
50. 'The common contract norms are essential to any behavior we might be
willing to call contractual .... " Id. at 346. "Contractual relations fall along a
'success spectrum.' Those contractual relations operating effectively will reveal
the common contract norms in robust condition, while those in varying degrees
of trouble will reveal the common contract norms in varying degrees of
disarray...." Id. at 351-52.
51. Macneil posits that extremely discrete transactions are obtained by a
"great magnification of two of the common contract norms: implementation of
planning and effectuation of consent." MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra
note 1, at 59-60.
52. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 345-47.
53. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 617 (1983) (describing this process).
54. Macneil provides a revealing example of what occurs when a "spun off'
area of relational law rubs up against traditional contract law. It is black letter
contract law that, in a third party beneficiary situation, a breach by the
promisor is a defense by the promisee against the third party beneficiary. If I
am having my paycheck made out to my son, and then stop teaching altogether
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in mid-semester, the school can stop sending the checks to my son. This familiar
rule is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 140 (1979).
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 259-62 (1960), involves just this
rule. In Benedict Coal, the United Mine Workers (UMW) had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with a multi-employer bargaining association.
Among other things, the agreement required Benedict Coal, a member of the
association, to pay a royalty on every ton of coal produced to the Trustees of the
UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund. The UMW struck Benedict Coal in
violation of the agreement. Benedict Coal withheld royalties from the Trustees
on coal produced during the course of this strike. After the strike ended, the
Trustees sued to get the royalties on that coal.
Benedict Coal presents a classic third party beneficiary situation. The
Trustees are third party beneficiaries of the UMW/Benedict Coal contract which
UMW breached. It seems clear that this breach should be a defense against the
Trustee's suit. Yet the Supreme Court noted that the contract was "not a typical
third party beneficiary contract," and held for the Trustees. Id. at 468. The
Court noted four reasons for its decision. First, the union and the industry had
jointly created a fiud to care not only for employees, but also their families and
any retirees. Without such a joint fund, corporations generally provide these
benefits independently. The Court held that "[t]he promisor's interest in the
third party here goes far beyond the mere performance of its promise to that
third party .... In a very real sense Benedict's interest in the soundness of the
fund and its management is no way less than that of the promisee union." Id. at
468-69. Second, Benedict was not the only promisor. If Benedict failed to pay
royalties, other coal companies might feel pressured to make up the short fall so
as to maintain the planned benefit schedule. The Court was not willing "to
assume that the other coal operators ... were willing to risk the threat of
diminution of the fund in order to protect those of their number who might have
become involved in local labor difficulties." Id. at 469. Third, Benedict could not
claim that it could recoup losses from the UMW's strike by garnishing the
wages of individual employees. Yet because pension payments are a form of
deferred compensation, that is precisely what Benedict attempted. Id. at 468-
69. Fourth, the Taft-Hartley Act states that suits against a union are
enforceable only against the union, not its members-indicating a congressional
intent that members not be made held accountable for the union's wrongs. Id.
at 470. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1994).
This is a good example of a marvelously relational decision. The way in
which this is not, as the Court said, a "typical third party beneficiary contract"
is precisely that it is not one in which an isolated promisor, promisee and
beneficiary stand in a purely discrete transaction. The Court addresses the
actual complexity and "thickness" of the relation by drawing in all the other
relations intermeshed with this one-that is, relations with employees, families,
retirees, the other coal companies. (Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground
that the old time religion was good enough for him. 'There is no reason for
jettisoning principles of fairness and justice that are as relevant to the law's
attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as they are to
contracts dealing with other affairs ...." Id. at 475-76 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
Illustration 10 of § 140 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1973), is based on Benedict Coal. Illustration 10 states:
A collective bargaining agreement between A, a labor union, and many
coal operators, including B, provides that each operator will pay 40
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law school discuss labor relations. It is an elective taken by
relatively few students. Indeed even most law professors
would be shocked by the idea that family law is just a
somewhat specialized course in contracts. This is partly
because we think of contract law as implementing and
enforcing the world of private agreements, while labor law
and family law are statutorily based public law, permeated
and informed by public policies imposed on these relations
by the body politic acting through its representatives.
Macneil's work has opened up a whole new area of legal
inquiry into the existence and nature of contract norms
common to the entire spectrum of contract behavior. This
inquiry leads to the further question of the extent to which
public law is concerned not with imposing external social
standards on private arrangements, but with attempting to
facilitate reciprocity, solidarity and the other contract
norms within certain types of private arrangements that
have completely outgrown the straitjacket of "contract
law."55 Macneil's attempt to identify the most fundamental
common contract norms is a beginning to these inquiries.
Comparing relational Contract Theory to two other
cents to C, trustee of a welfare fund for coal miners, for each ton of coal
mined. In violation of the agreement A calls a strike of B's employees.
B is not entitled to deduct the resulting damage from the payments due
to C.
This Illustration flatly contradicts the rule of § 140, as well as the preceding
Illustration 9. The Restatement gives no explanation for this discrepancy
whatsoever. As Macneil notes, "apparently the vague language 'considerations
of fairness or public policy' set out in the comment is the explanation for this
inconsistency." Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 1, at 600 (footnote omitted).
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing notions of fairness). In
the final version of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 140 of
Tentative Draft Number 8 appears as § 309(2). Illustration 10 remains
unchanged. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309(2) (1979).
55. In recent years, a number of legal scholars, largely from the standpoint
of critical legal studies or other "left" perspectives, have criticized those who
distinguish between "public" and "private" realms. They submit that these
worlds are not mutually exclusive, that the private realm is not removed from
state coercion and power. Instead, certain persons or classes of persons in the
private realm assume and exercise state power against others. These scholars'
main point is that the "free" private realm is permeated by public power. See
MATTHEW H. KRAMER, CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINISM
243-47 (1995); see generally Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). Macneil's work likewise undermines the
private/public distinction, but from a different direction. His concern is with the
extent to which the public realm exists not to implement its own norms but to
strengthen and implement the norms of private relations.
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common ways of thinking about contracts-that of law and
economics as well as traditional liberalism of the
Rawls/Dworkin variety-further clarifies the alternative it
presents to familiar notions of contracting. Richard Posner,
Andrew Rosenfield and Charles Fried have written on the
perennial problem in contract law of when to excuse a
contractual obligation on grounds that the duty has become
too onerous due to the occurrence of an event for which the
parties' agreement did not plan.56 The law deals with this
question through the doctrines of impossibility, impracti-
cability, frustration of purpose and mistake. Both
economists Posner and Rosenfield and liberal theorist Fried
agree on the basic approach to this issue: a court confronted
with this problem is confronted with a problem of allocating
to one of the parties a risk that the parties did not at the
time of agreement allocate themselves. They maintain that
courts should do this by asking what the parties would have
done at the time of agreement had they allocated the risk.57
At this point, their respective analyses diverge radically.
Posner and Rosenfield believe that courts should place
the risk of loss on the cheaper risk bearer while Fried
believes that parties should share the losses caused by
unallocated risk." Their analyses diverge because deter-
mining how reasonable parties would have allocated risk
necessarily involves assumptions about human nature and
motivation. Posner and Rosenfield assume that humans are
purely self-interested:
If the purpose of the law of contracts is to effectuate the desires of
the contracting parties, then the proper criterion for evaluating
the rules of contract law is surely that of economic efficiency. Since
the object of most voluntary exchanges is to increase value or
efficiency, contracting parties may be assumed to desire a set of
56. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83
(1977); Charles Fried, Gaps, in CONTRACT AS PROISE 57, 57-73 (1981).
57. Posner and Rosenfield preface their discussion by noting: "A second
purpose [of contract law], central to our subject, is to reduce the costs of contract
negotiation by supplying contract terms that the parties would probably have
adopted explicitly had they negotiated over them." Posner & Rosenfield, supra
note 56, at 88. Fried maintains that, "Since actual intent is (by hypothesis)
missing, a court respects the autonomy of the parties so far as possible by
construing an allocation of burdens and benefits that reasonable persons would
have made in this kind of arrangement." FRIED, supra note 56, at 73.
58. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 90; Fried, supra note 56, at
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contract terms that will maximize the value of the exchange. 9
Fried, on the other hand, says that to ask what the
parties would have done is "an inquiry with unavoidably
normative elements: 'reasonable' parties do not merely seek
to accomplish rational objectives; they do so constrained by
norms of fairness and honesty.""
In Macneil's work, neither pure self-interest nor
abstract moral considerations like fairness generally govern
the contracting parties' behavior. Instead, something in
between-more particularized norms generated by the
contractual relation itself and related to the relation in a
functional way-govern contracting behavior.6 This is not
to say that considerations of fairness are not a component of
the contract norms. The norms of reciprocity and propriety
of means, just to take two, obviously invoke fairness
concerns. But abstract fairness here takes its concrete sense
from within the relation itself. It is one element among
others and, because norms sometimes conflict, it may be
subordinated to others (as may the norm of effectuating
consent). 2  Recognizing the multiplicity and complex
59. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 89.
60. Fried, supra note 56, at 73.
61. Concerning this "mid-level" aspect of exchange relations, Macneil has
said:
The level of values I have been discussing-values of contract behavior
and of internal principles and rules-is an extremely important one. It
is also one too often partially or entirely overlooked in contract
scholarship, which tends to focus either on the next level-the
response, especially the legal response, of external society to contract-
or on only the discrete transactional aspects of this level. The
importance stems from the fact that this is the real operating level-
the real life level of exchange relations. Consequently, this is the level
at which implementation of values undoubtedly has by far the greatest
impact upon the lives of the participants and everyone affected by their
activities.
Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 351.
62. Macneil argues that notions of fairness "are far too narrow to encompass
such basic relational norms as role integrity, reciprocity, contractual solidarity,
balancing power in acceptable ways, propriety of means (doing things the right
way), and harmonizing the relations with the external social matrix in which
they occur." Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not
Know, supra note 46, at 503. Recall Macneil's comment that only a vague
reference to "fairness and public policy" allows one to explain the conflict
between RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309(2) (1979) and its
Illustration 10, based on the Benedict Coal decision. Such vague references do
little to help one understand the Benedict Coal holding, or to apply its reasoning
to other cases involving relational contracts generally. See generally supra note
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interaction of contract norms, Macneil calls for a "rich
classificatory apparatus" to analyze contracts-as opposed
specifically to the economic emphasis on efficiency and
impliedly to the liberal emphasis on "fairness."63
Note that "effectuation of consent" (which under
classical contract theory might be the only recognized
contract norm) and "implementation of planning" are only
two out of ten contract norms. It appears that some
authority outside the parties to the contract imposes the
other eight norms-by definition norms not related to
consent. Here, again, Relational Contract Theory challenges
our received way of thinking about contractual obligation.
Macneil tries to bridge the traditional dichotomy by means
of the notion of "consent to a relation":
Liberal society has always recognized numerous legitimate
relations into which entry is by consent, but the content of which is
largely unknown at the time the consent was given. This is the
idea of joining a relation. We can join a law firm or a university
faculty... ; we can join the army; we can join a corporation by
buying its shares; we can join in holy matrimony. In each instance
we can do so in spite of large-scale ignorance about the restraints
we are accepting. In spite of our ignorance liberal society will bind
us to those unknown restraints.6
54.
63. See Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations, supra note 1,
at 1062-63.
64. Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOOD
HALL L.J. 5, 20-21 (1984). The examples Macneil gives in this passage are
somewhat misleading because they all involve "sharp" moments of establishing
the relation (taking the oath of enlistment, participating in a wedding
ceremony, buying shares of stock). Many relations evolve slowly over time. A
one-shot purchase of goods may over months or years lead to an elaborate
commercial relation between a buyer and a seller, a relation which may or may
not be embodied in formal contractual terms. This aspect of Macneil's thought is
the target of Randy Barnett's critique of Macneil's work. See Randy E. Barnett,
Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract,
78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992). Barnett's main point is that by cutting out of
contract theory the discrete notion of consent embodied in the doctrine of
agreement, Macneil has made it too difficult to tell when one has entered into a
relationship that has legal consequences-that is, to which the contract law will
be applied.
The liberal conception of the rule of law is based on the notion that
persons need access to knowledge of when they will be subjected to
legal sanctions and when they will not .... It does persons who would
contemplate engaging in Macneilian contractual exchanges little good
to be told that maybe legal sanctions will be used to "reinforce" your
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To put it another way, consent to a relation entails
consent to being bound by the norms of the relation, even if
those norms ultimately turn out to conflict with elements of
the initial consent. But does this mean that these norms are
imposed non-consensually? Clearly, the authority of these
norms fits neatly into neither of the two liberal sources of
authority for binding rules: consent of the parties and
promulgation by the consensually selected representatives
of the citizenry." The seeming paradox of Relational
Contract Theory is in its assertion that one can have
consented to the application of norms that may override the
terms of one's explicit consent.
Macneil's treatment of liquidated damages and penalty
relationship, but maybe not. Ask us again after you exchange.
Id. at 1191 (footnote omitted). Yet given Stewart Macauley's research into the
role legal rules and sanctions actually play in commercial practice, it is not
clear just how tremendously important it is that persons have access to this
knowledge. That they do need it may be a position itself based on and assuming
a discrete view of contracts and of human action, and so cannot be used to
defend that view. (Recall Macneil's praise of the acknowledged "imprecision and
flexibility" inherent in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 241 (1979), on
materiality of breach. See generally supra note 26.) As Macneil says, it is a
characteristic of discrete contract law that "as much as possible of the content of
the relation... is forced into a pattern of material assent expressed at some
instantaneous point of time," and any content "which cannot sensibly be
rationalized into a pattern of instantaneous material assent, will be supplied eo
instante by the legal system in a form as precisely predictable as possible."
Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 1, at 593-94. A second answer is that given
by Robert Gordon:
I am always a bit taken aback to hear lawyers argue, as they
sometimes do, that for all its faults the old formal-classical system of
rules had the virtues of predictability and administrative convenience;
its results might be sometimes arbitrary or unjust but at least one
knew where one stood. I should have thought if there was one proof the
Realists critics had managed to nail down for good it was that of the
manipulability and contextual variability of the old rule-system. If the
rules are stable and predictable in particular practice settings-as of
course they usually are, at least in the short-to-medium term-that
stability derives from well-accepted conventions within the community
of regular interpreters of the rule.
Gordon, supra note 46, at 566 n.1.
65. Macneil notes that in the political theory of the liberal state, only two
justifications exist for applying rules to anyone, both grounded on consent. One
is individual or contractual consent, whereby individual manifestation of a
willingness to be bound in relatively specific ways constitutes submissions to
rules (sometimes hereafter called "liberal contract"). The other is collective
consent, whereby democratic state processes yield the application of rules by
the sovereign. See Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, supra note
64, at 5.
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clauses illustrates how this aspect of the theory works. A
basic rule of contract law is that the parties to a contract
may provide by agreement what the damages will be in the
event of a breach of the contract. However, the doctrine of
the penalty clause limits this ability. A penalty clause is a
provision that provides for liquidated damages, but in an
amount unreasonably large in relation to the actual
damages caused by the breach. Such provisions will not be
enforced.66 The doctrine of penalty clauses has always been
a bit of a problem in contract law, since it is unclear why a
voluntary agreement as to damages should not be
enforced.67 For Richard Posner, in particular, the refusal to
enforce provisions denominated as penalties is an anomaly
in the otherwise efficient common law of contracts.68
Macneil argues that the legal hostility to penalty
clauses is explained by the fact that consent can conflict
with, and be overridden by, another contract norm-that of
limiting unilateral power in contractual relations.69 What
does Macneil gain by referring to a norm of limiting
unilateral power instead of to Fried-like notions of fairness?
First, it establishes connections between things that might
otherwise just seem to be disparate elements of contract
law-for example penalty clauses, the limited nature of
contract remedies in general, ° unconscionability and good
faith7' and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.72
66. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
356 (1979).
67. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 173-77 (2d ed. 1993) ("There may be instances in which
liquidated damage provisions are so extreme as to shock one's conscience, but
by and large such instances are likely to involve individual consumers... and
are probably best dealt with through an application of the unconscionability
doctrine.")
68. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 115-17; Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cli. L. REV. 281, 290 (1979). See also Lake
River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985), in which now
Judge Posner writes an opinion severely criticizing the penalty clause doctrine,
then strikes one down in obedience to controlling Illinois law.
69. See Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations, supra note 1,
at 1054-62.
70. See id. at 1059; MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 56-57.
71. See Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations, supra note 1,
at 1060.
72. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 376 ("[E]mployment
law provides a good example of sovereign imposition of the power norm.").
Macneil has put forth the hypothesis that "American legal rules... tend toward
limiting (as well as creating) unilateral power in contractual relations of all
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Second, it inquires into the ways in which this norm is not
just an application of a generalized moral principle of
fairness applied to the contract from outside, but is
functionally related to sustaining healthy contractual
relations which satisfy the often contradictory needs of
human beings."
Finally we must consider whether application of the
norm of restraint of unilateral power is consensual or non-
consensual. Relational Contract Theory teaches that when
committing to a relation, we cannot specify all the
obligations and responsibilities that relation will entail. But
it also suggests that we do commit ourselves to the norms
necessary to maintain the health of that relation."4 The
theory then challenges us to develop a more expansive non-
discrete notion of commitment and consent.
III. PHILOSOPHY
Ultimately Macneil's departure from utilitarianism may
not be radical enough. Macneil recognizes that humans are
both selfish and social but still conceives of their selfish side
in utilitarian terms-as the acquisition of something from
an exchange."5 In other words, the pay-off of the exchange is
kinds" and he has argued that his hypothesis is just as empirically testable, and
just as true, as Posner's hypothesis that common law rules tend to promote
economic efficiency. See Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations,
supra note 1, at 1056-62. For a statement of Posner's position, see Richard A.
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281
(1979).
73. Macneil's emphasis on the functional relation between the contract
norms and flourishing contractual relations has led his theory to be criticized as
inherently conservative in an ideological sense. The crux of the criticism is that
Macneil views the role of law as one restoring the "harmony" of society in the
face of conflict, which is always seen as a bad thing. "The state as an
instrument of class domination and control, or as a bureaucratic organization
resting on legitimated domination are theories pushed to one side." Ken Foster,
Book Review, 9 J.L. & Soc-Y 144, 147 (1982) (reviewing TAN-R. MACNEIL, THE
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT). Macneil does point out that relational contract theory
is not incompatible with a high degree of conflict, and he does not view conflict
as always dysfunctional. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 352-
53. For a more sympathetic view of Macneil's work from a politically left
perspective, see generally Gordon, supra note 46.
74. This does not mean that contractual relations should never end. Of
course they can and do. But it means that this termination-its timing, its
motivation, its manner, its processes-must itself be in accord with the contract
norms, just as was the life of the relation.
75. This is to say, Macneil tends to conceive of exchange as purely "the
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separate from the exchange itself. Indeed, contracts
scholars largely think of contracts as beneficial in so far as,
and because, one gets something from them. Aristotle,
however, long ago distinguished between actions performed
for the sake of a product (which Aristotle called
"productive") and actions performed for the value of the
action itself.6
Consider a person catching a fish." For the commercial
fisherman, his work is a means to an end-a haul of fish-
without which his labor is lost. If the fisherman were to
inherit a fortune, he would no longer fish for a living.
Compare him to the sport fisher who may go through many
of the same motions as the commercial fisher. Aristotle
would say the sport fisher achieves his purpose "in action"
rather than in its outcome. His day is not spoiled if the big
one gets away. It is true that catching fish is his object-
giving to his activity intensity, focus and seriousness it
would otherwise lack. But he may, for example, go after
trout with a light rod because they are harder and more fun
to catch that way. Intentionally making it hard would be
irrational for the commercial fisher, but it is perfectly
understandable if the amateur does not only this but also
gives his entire catch to his neighbor. It was not the fish he
wanted, but the activity of catching them.
Note that in the difference between the two fisherman,
means and ends change places. For the commercial fisher,
fishing is the means toward which the fish are the end; for
the sport fisher, they are reversed. Aristotle taught that the
only thing that is truly good in itself is activity performed
for its own sake; productive actions have only derivative
value. 8 Crudely put, making tennis rackets is of no value if
giving up of something in return for receiving something else." Macneil,
Exchange Revisited, supra note 1, at 567.
76. See ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1139bl-4 (Richard McKeon ed. & David Ross trans., 1925).
77. This discussion is deeply indebted to Warner A. Wick, The Rat and the
Squirrel, 82 ETHICS 21 (1971).
78. For aristotle practical intellect means reason in the service of the human
desire for the good.
[Practical intellect] rules the productive intellect [reason in the service
of making of things such as technology] as well, since every one who
makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the
unqualified sense .... - only that which is done is that; for good action
is an end, and desire aims at this.
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 76, at IT 1139bl-4, 1098b9-1099b8.
787
RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
at least some people do not simply enjoy playing tennis. The
Greeks customarily regarded most productive activities as
servile, because nobody would do them for their own sakes
but would assign them to a slave if possible. Free persons
concerned themselves with activities that were called "free"
because they were subservient to nothing outside them."
This is quite different from our modern way of thinking,
which tends to regard all serious activity as productive,
while non-productive activity is recreation, leisure or
consumption.
The discrete/relational distinction forms a striking
continuum from contracts done for the sake of a product on
one end to those done for the sake of the activity of
maintaining the contractual relation on the other end. The
point of a discrete sale of goods is, of course, to possess the
goods or money that one gets from the exchange. But
towards the relational end of the continuum, possession of
any exchange surplus begins to share equal time with the
satisfaction gained from the activity of the relation itself. At
the far end of the relational continuum is the family, which
some theorists describe simply as an institution for
exchanging the products of labor specialization." Yet
certainly the decision to enter into family relations is
motivated by more than just a desire for low cost products.
Indeed in discrete transactions, contracting takes place for
the sake of the exchange, while in relational contracts the
exchange is for the sake of the contractual relation itself.8'
How does the distinction between productive activities
and activities chosen for their own sake help clarify issues
of contract law? In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,"' the
defendant had fired the plaintiff who sued for breach of an
implied contract not to terminate his employment except for
good cause, similar to the discussion above in See's
Candies." He also sued for the tort of breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.84 This tort cause of
79. See Wick, supra note 77, at 27-28.
80. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 127-29.
81. Posner tries to account for this aspect of marriage by saying that
marriage includes elements of altruism, which he describes as "a cheap and
efficacious substitute for (formal) contracting." Id. at 129.
82. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
84. Foley, 765 P.2d at 374.
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action originated in a line of insurance cases.85 If an
insurance company wrongfully denies a valid claim under a
policy, that is a breach of the insurance contract. But if an
insurance company wrongfully denies a claim with full
knowledge that it is a good claim, courts hold this to be not
only a simple breach of contract but also a punishable tort.
This, of course, gives the insured the possibility of greatly
enhanced damages, including punitive damages.
Courts created this insurers' tort partly because they
felt that when an insured suffers a loss, a conflict of interest
arises between the insured and insurer which is not present
in other types of contracts. 6 The result is that the insurer
has an incentive to breach that only the larger threat of tort
damages will deter. Additionally, courts felt there is a
"special relationship" between insurer and insured that
takes such contracts out of the category of purely
"commercial contracts." That is, the purpose of the insured
in entering the contract is not to secure profit or advantage,
but security or peace of mind."
Should courts extend the tort of bad faith breach of
from the insurance context to the employment context? Put
another way, should the employee's interest in his job be
reducible to the pure economic benefits he gets from it?
That was the question the California Supreme Court faced.
In a 4-3 decision, the Foley court held the extension was not
warranted. Contrast the relevant language from the
majority and vigorous dissenting opinions. The majority
opinion maintained:
[A] breach in the employment context does not place the employee
in the same economic dilemma that an insured faces when an
insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim .... [T]he insured
cannot turn to the marketplace to find another insurance company
willing to pay for the loss already incurred. The wrongfully
85. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967), is a
seminal case. Other leading cases are Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032 (Cal. 1973), and Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis.
1978).
86. For good summaries and discussions of the development of this tort, see
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance
Transactions After Two Decades, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 1153 (1995); Roger C.
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions:
Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by
Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1992).
87. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 390.
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terminated employee... can and must... make reasonable efforts
to seek alternative employment. Moreover, the role of the
employer differs from that of the "quasi-public" insurance company
with whom individuals contract specifically in order to obtain
protection from potential... economic harm. The employer does
not similarly "sell" protection to its employees; it is not providing a
public service. Nor do we find convincing the idea that the
employee is necessarily seeking a different kind of financial
security than those entering a typical commercial contract. If a
small dealer contracts for goods from a large supplier and those
goods are vital to the small dealer's business, a breach by the
supplier may have financial significance for individuals employed
by the dealer or to the dealer himself. Permitting only contract
damages in such a situation has ramifications no different from a
similar limitation in the direct employer-employee relationship.
88
Justices Broussard stated in dissent: "A man or a
woman does not enter into employment solely for the
money; a job is status, reputation, a way of defining one's
self-worth and worth in the community .... In short, 'in a
modern industrialized economy employment is central to
one's existence and dignity.' "" Justice Kaufman argued in
his dissenting opinion:
It is, at best, naive to believe that the availability of the
"marketplace," or that a supposed "alignment of interests," renders
the employment relationship less special or less subject to abuse
than the relationship between insurer and insured. Indeed, I can
think of no relationship in which one party, the employee, places
more reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or
is more vulnerable to abuse by the other, than the relationship
between employer and employee. And, ironically, the relative
imbalance of economic power between employer and employee
tends to increase rather than diminish the longer that relationship
continues. Whatever bargaining strength and marketability the
employee may have at the moment of hiring, diminishes rapidly
thereafter. Marketplace? What market is there for the factory
worker laid off after 25 years of labor in the same plant, or for the
middle-aged executive fired after 25 years with the same firm?
Financial security? Can anyone seriously dispute that employment
is generally sought, at least in part, for financial security and all
that implies: food on the table, shelter, clothing, medical care,
education for one's children .... Peace of mind? One's work
obviously involves more than just earning a living. It defines for
88. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 407-08 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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many people their identity, their sense of self-worth, their sense of
belonging. The wrongful and malicious destruction of one's
employment is far more certain to result in serious emotional
distress than any wrongful denial of an insurance claim. 
°
It might help to think about the opposition between the
majority and dissenting opinions in this way: the majority
regards employment as a relation that only has value in the
separable economic "products" that the employee gets out of
it, while the dissenters think about employment as a
relation that has an inherent, non-commercial value for the
employee. The dissenters suggest that employees find value
in the activity of the job itself, thus making the relation
seem, at least partly, more like the- non-commercial
insurance contract.
If Relational Contract Theory is to have an impact in
the world of actual legal decision-making rather than just
in legal academia, it will be in helping the legal profession
to think about how cases like the Youngstown steel workers
and Mr. Foley should come out, freed from the hypnotic
sway of the discrete transaction. In developing Relational
Contract Theory, one of the most important things lawyers
and law professors can do, ill-suited perhaps as they are to
do it, is to return to philosophical questions of the
motivation of human action, its natural ends and goals and
its distinctive virtue and characteristic excellence, 9' as the
Greeks would have said. Without this understanding, we
90. Id. at 414-15 (Kaufinan, J.,dissenting).
91. It has become increasingly common today to deny that this is even
doable because humans have no distinctive virtues. This large philosophical
issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, but for an argument that the task
suggested here is both possible and necessary, see Martha C. Nussbaum,
Human Functioning and Social Justice, 20 POLITICAL THEORY 202 (1992);
Martha Nussbaum,. Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE
QUALITY OF LIFE 242, 242-69 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
Indeed Macneil has said that "[t]he basis in nature of relational contract
theory.., suggests a value in seeking further knowledge about the
fundamental nature or natures of man." Macneil, Values in Contract, supra
note 1, at 412. Macneil seems to think that this idea leads to "social,
psychological, and biological investigation of various kinds." Id. Another large
question, again beyond the scope of this Essay, is the extent to which inquiries
into the nature of man-based on the techniques of modern science or social
science-contribute to a complete understanding of human nature, and to what
extent they encourage us to lose sight of that nature. For a provocative
discussion, see ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 173-79, 356-
80 (1987).
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cannot construct theoretical models that will adequately
reflect humans' interests and commitments in contracting
behavior.92
CONCLUSION
I want to close on a cautionary note. Since Relational
Contract Theory resides within the discipline of law, there
is a real question as to the extent that law as an institution
can promote the norms of relational contracts. Let me start
again with a few examples.
Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing
with sales of goods, provides that a buyer of goods cannot
sue for breach in any case in which the buyer has accepted
the goods unless the buyer has provided notice of breach.
This provision has a perfectly good relational purpose.
When the buyer accepts goods, the seller is likely to think
that the transaction is satisfactory to the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-
607 prevents the buyer from surprising the seller with a
law suit. It gives the seller and the buyer a chance to work
out the buyer's dissatisfaction informally. It opens the way
for settlement and negotiation, and it eliminates the harsh,
and discrete, common law rule that acceptance of goods by a
buyer waived all legal remedies.
But what constitutes adequate "notice of breach?" In
Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.," the U.S.
Court of Appeals held that it was insufficient for the buyer
92. Another area of Macneil's work that shades into major philosophical
issues is in asking why has the legal community exhibited such a distorting bias
in favor of discreteness. Macneil has suggested that the bias stems from a
commitment to rationality for the sake of rationality. 'Man has an immense
desire for order and consistency," and, more, for control over a shifting and
uncertain existence. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 393-94. Even
more, "the very nature of reason has been transformed in bureaucratic
structures, with wisdom stripped out, leaving nothing but 'functionality or
calculability.' " Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and Community-
American Style, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 900, 902 (1984) [hereinafter Macneil,
Bureaucracy, Liberalism and Community]. Macneil even suggests that human
reason is now engaged in the attempt "to liberate itself from all else that makes
us human." Id. at 901. Here Macneil joins hands with the work of Stanley
Cavell. Cavell maintains that human obsession with reason and with
knowledge, with knowing the world as our primary access to it, is an attempt to
escape the conditions of human existence and thus threatens loss of what Kant
calls our human finitude. See generally STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON
(1979).
93. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
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just to express some kind of dissatisfaction with the goods
or the transaction-that was inadequate to keep the seller
from being later surprised by a lawsuit. Rather, the court
said that the notice must "inform the seller that the
transaction is claimed to involve a breach."94 This comes
close to saying that the seller must threaten a lawsuit in
order to maintain its ability to file one. This legal rule
seems contrary to the goal of smoothing contractual
relations and encouraging amicable resolution of disputes.
Professor Stewart Macaulay, whose groundbreaking
research into contract behavior is also one of the
wellsprings of Relational Contract Theory, found that
business persons not only rarely assert legal rights, but
understand such assertions as an expression of distrust."
Another brief example is the trend in employment law
today to recognize employee handbooks and personnel
manuals as contractually binding on employers. But once
courts recognized that these handbooks create contractual
obligations, they had to recognize that employers could
contractually avoid these obligations, for example by adding
prominent disclaimers. Because courts strictly construe
these disclaimers, they must be prominent and explicit.
Here is an example of a handbook disclaimer a Michigan
appellate court approved and enforced:
The contents of this handbook are presented as a matter of
information only. While [Employer] believes wholeheartedly in the
plans, policies and procedures described here, they are not
conditions of employment. [Employer] reserves the right to modify,
revoke, suspend, terminate or change any or all such plans,
policies or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time, with or
without notice. The language used in this handbook is not
intended to create, nor is it to be construed to constitute,96a
contract between [Employer] and any one or all of its employees.
This language was italicized and outlined in red in the
handbook. When I practiced employment law, one of my
94. Id. at 976.
95. Stewart Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, PRAC. LAW, Nov. 1996, at 13 (1963); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business].
96. Kari v. General Motors Corp., 261 N.W.2d 222, 223 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977).
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jobs was to see that every one of our clients' handbooks
contained such a disclaimer. Employers resisted including
the disclaimers because the language seemed to undermine
the handbook's partial goal of improving employer/employee
relations. To many clients a handbook with such a
prominent disclaimer seemed worse than no handbook at
all. Yet given the expense of even unsuccessful litigation,
employers are almost forced to incorporate these
disclaimers.
One can argue that justice demands judicial recognition
of handbooks as contracts, that it appears unfair to allow
employers to ignore their own enunciated norms and that
employees deserve protection from such arbitrary employer
abuse of power. But it is a real question as to which regime
was better for employees: one in which there was no legal
enforcement of handbooks and there were occasional
abuses, or one in which the law enforces handbooks as
contracts. The issue here is not which regime was fairer,
but rather which regime was more conducive to flourishing
contractual relations with high levels of solidarity and
reciprocity. (Naturally, fairness, as captured in norms like
restraint of unilateral power and propriety of means, is
subsumed in this analysis.) Of course there would be no
problem if it were costless to treat employee handbooks as
conferring contractual rights. Then employees would have
both a belt and suspenders; the immanent norms of
contractual relations would protect most employees from
abuse while the enforcement of handbook statements as
contracts would rein in those employers who engaged in
abusive, arbitrary behavior. But what if the enforcement of
legal rights tended to undermine contractual norms, as if
wearing suspenders caused one's belt to atrophy?
One thing Relational Contract Theory has taught us is
that the threat of legal sanction is not a very effective tool
to fight abuse of power and opportunism in contracts.97
97. This does not mean, of course, that law is wholly useless or could be
dispensed with. Macneil says the institution of law has several functions. It is
an institution generally providing social solidarity. It also functions as "a back-
up system seldom used actively, but always used passively." MACNEIL, NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 94. Finally, it functions "as a relatively
precise expression-an index if you will-of the great underlying and diffuse
sea of custom and social practices in which human affairs are conducted. This
function of law is to tell society what is most important among its customs and
practices." Id. at 93-94.
794
1998] RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
Stewart Macaulay's pioneering research showed (and in the
1960s shocked contracts professors) that business persons
ranked legal sanctions extremely low on the scale of reasons
for keeping contracts. 98 It is not, as Richard Epstein has
argued,' that there is a competitive market for labor where
employees can vote with their feet and the forces of
competition do not simply weed abusive employers out of
the market.' Rather, in highly relational contracts there
are myriad motivations at work beyond gain maximization.
Relational Contract Theory accounts for behavioral norms
that are not reducible to efficiency. This does not mean that
something like McDonnell-Douglas is a bad decision. 101 It
may be about as good an interpretation of UCC § 2-607 as
can be given. But as Macneil has said:
Lawyers often forget that imposed procedural regularity is needed
and useful only when good faith and trust decline below certain
levels. They forget that it in turn breeds distrust .... The rise of
procedural regularity respecting student-university relations is
often hailed as a great step toward equality and justice. It can just
as well be viewed as the result of a vast decline in trust and
perceptions about an absence of good faith. So viewed it is a huge
step backward. 1
2
98. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, supra
note 95.
99. See generally, Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. Cmi. L. REv. 947 (1984).
100. See Pauline Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
105, 111-13 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The
Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1783 (1996); Steven L.
Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection:
Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988).
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. MACNEIL, NEW SociAL CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 68. This very issue
was recently raised by political columnist E.J. Dionne, Jr., in the context of the
U.S. Air Force's move to court martial Lt. Kelly Flinn for adultery, under vague
regulations forbidding conduct harmful to military "good order and discipline."
The threatened court martial set off a public controversy over the extent to
which the military should enforce codes of appropriate sexual behavior. Dionne
wrote:
Defense Secretary William Cohen has set up panels to study these
issues. The unpleasant fact they face is this: What's required are not
fewer rules, but more rules, more explicitly stated. You can do with a
short rule book and a lot of flexibility when there's consensus and
people basically trust the system. Right now, there is no consensus and
limited trust.
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When the legal system applies from without the same
norm as is internally generated in a relationship, imposing
the norm from the outside transforms the norm and gives it
different practical consequences.' A duty of good faith
bargaining imposed on unions and employers by the
National Labor Relations Act is profoundly different than
actual good faith bargaining between the two.'
Lawyers have been slow to realize not only just how
limited law is as a tool of social engineering, but also how
complex are its effects. This is in large part because they
have narrow, discrete views of social norms. Law is rights-
oriented and adjudicative, is backward looking rather than
forward looking and tends to focus on the narrow dispute
before it as opposed to considering the effect of its decision
on the future of the parties. °5 Professor Gideon Gottlieb
E. J. Dionne, Jr., The Military Will Deal with Sex, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., June
14, 1997, at B-6. Of course, the more numerous and explicit rules cannot
possibly replace the lost trust, and Macneil suggests that they will in fact
continue to undermine it. MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 68.
This issue relates to another which Macneil views as somewhat separate from
his adumbration of relational contract theory. Macneil views bureaucracy as the
main threat to a humane social life. "[T]he scarcity of nonbureaucratic
producers of a common conscience is perhaps our major modern social problem."
Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 352 n.36. Macneil believes that
increasingly dominant bureaucratic structures provide a weak and brittle form
of contract solidarity and leave contract norms impoverished. Id. at 416-18. His
concern goes far beyond the effect of legal imposition of norms, since Macneil
believes that private bureaucracies are more dangerous in this regard than
public ones (which include the law). Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and
Community, supra note 92, at 917-18. Therefore, "the only possible way to
humanize an excessively bureaucratic world is by reducing large bureaucracy in
favor of community." Id. at 900. Indeed Macneil sympathizes with much of the
anti-bureaucratic thought of Critical Legal Studies scholars; one of his main
criticisms of that school is that the solutions it proposes often themselves
involve large state bureaucracies and so exacerbate the disease. For example,
Macneil pungently comments on Roberto Unger's call for "the establishment of
a rotating capital fund." Id. at 928-29. Yet we have also become tremendously
dependent on an economic system founded on vast amounts of sunk capital and
very elaborate systems of technology, which can only be sustained by
bureaucracies. Id. at 922-24. This dilemma gives a somewhat pessimistic cast to
Macneil's work in this area.
103. See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 CINN. L.
REV. 1283, 1302-03 (1990).
104. See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 1, at 369-82 (discussing
generally the effect of sovereign imposition of contract norms).
105. Indeed in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (1988), the only
practical difference between the majority and dissenting views was the amount
of money Mr. Foley was to receive.
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points out that adjudication is to a contractual relation as
radical surgery is to a patient,16 although an autopsy may
be a better metaphor. Legal training is partly to blame.
Law schools, especially in the first year, generally use the
case method where students read almost nothing but
appellate decisions in which parties sitting in the ruins of
dead relations fight over the allocation of spoils and losses.
A dawning realization of the limitedness of legal techniques
has led to the current growing legal interest in alternative
dispute resolution, mediation and counseling, and the
awareness that such modes of dispute resolution are
concerned with articulating and extending the norms of a
relationship, not just with giving structure and order to a
clash of power. The major inquiry remaining for relational
contract theorists, then, concerns how to make law a more
effective instrument for reinforcing contract norms, given
our new understanding of the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of those norms.
106. Gideon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50
U. CHi. L. REv. 567, 602 (1983).
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